

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: SCC-COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S STATEMENT AT FINAL
MEETING, OCTOBER 28, 1974 (SCC-IV-019)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE BY COMMISSIONER
GRAYBEAL AT FINAL MEETING OF SCC-IV.

QUOTE

STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL
AT FINAL MEETING OF SCC-IV
OCTOBER 28, 1974

I

MR COMMISSIONER, TODAY, AT THIS LAST MEETING OF SCC-IV
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSION
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ON GENERAL APPROACHES OR PRINCIPLES FOR WORKING OUT SPECIFIC

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS. YOUR STATEMENT AND MINE TOGETHER SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO USEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE WORK IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT REGULAR SESSION OF THE SCC BY PROVIDING A SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL APPROACHES, PRINCIPLES, OR CRITERIA WHICH EACH COMPONENT OF THE SCC CONSIDERS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS WE WORK OUT SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS AT SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS. AS WE HAVE AGREED, THE PRINCIPLES OF APPROACH ARE REGARDED BY BOTH SIDES AS PRELIMINARY AND EACH SIDE HAS THE RIGHT TO MODIFY THEM OR ADD OTHER PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD.

II

BOTH SIDES ARE AGREED THAT THE PROCEDURES WHICH WE ARE TO WORK OUT FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY AND APPLICABLE AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THAT TREATY AND ON THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS WHICH ENTER INTO FORCE ON JULY 3, 1974.

IN ADDITION, THE U.S. COMPONENT BELIEVES THAT THE PROCEDURES TO BE WORKED OUT MUST ALSO BE BASED ON THE PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY SIGNED ON JULY 3, 1974 AT MOSCOW. WE HAVE FOUND NOTHING IN YOUR STATEMENT TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET COMPONENT DOES NOT, IN PRINCIPLE, AGREE WITH THE VALIDITY OF THIS APPROACH.

III

MR. COMMISSIONER, ON SEPTEMBER 26 I SET FORTH SIX GENERAL PRINCIPLES OR CRITERIA WHICH THE U.S. SIDE CONSIDERS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT SPECIFIC PROCEDURES RELATED TO ABM SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS TO BE REPLACED AND DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED AND THOSE TO BE USED AS REPLACEMENTS. THEY ARE:

(1) THE PROCEDURES MUST ENSURE THAT THE LIMITS OF THE ABM TREATY AND ITS PROTOCOL ARE NOT

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EXCEEDED DURING THE REPLACEMENT PROCESS AS A RESULT OF OVERLAPPING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES.

(2) THE PROCEDURES MUST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO PERMIT AN ORDERLY REPLACEMENT PROGRAM, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CERTAIN OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.

(3) THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE MUST NOT BE DIMINISHED AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROCEDURES.

(4) REPLACEMENT AND DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES MUST BE WORKED OUT BOTH FOR CURRENT ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS AND FOR THE EXCHANGE OF ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS. HOWEVER, THE PROCEDURES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE THE SAME FOR BOTH SITUATIONS.

(5) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURES MUST BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

(6) THE PROCEDURES MUST PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE NOTIFICATION.

IV

OUR DISCUSSIONS AT THIS SESSION HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE LAST TWO U.S.-PROPOSED PRINCIPLES ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEWS ON NOTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION WHICH THE SOVIET COMPONENT HAS EXPRESSED. WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURES MUST BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND MUST ALSO MEET THE REACTIVATION TIME AND OTHER CRITERIA AGREED TO IN THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS. WE ALSO AGREE THAT THE PROCEDURES TO BE WORKED OUT MUST PROVIDE FOR TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATION. STUDY OF OUR STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT SUGGESTS THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN EACH SIDE'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES ADEQUATE OR APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATION. IN THE U.S. VIEWS, THE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES PREVIOUSLY AGREED REMAIN VALID,

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BUT LACK THE SCOPE AND DETAIL REQUIRED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF UNIQUE ASPECTS ASSOCIATED WITH REPLACEMENT AT CURRENT DEPLOYMENT AREAS AND WITH THE EXCHANGE OR DEPLOYMENT AREAS. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. SIDE BELIEVES THAT WE MUST WORK OUT THE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY THE PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY.

V

THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN US THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF NEITHER SIDE SHOULD BE DIMINISHED AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURES. ANY SUCH DIMINUTION OF EITHER SIDE'S SECURITY WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF OBJECTIVES OF THE ABM TREATY OR WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL SECURITY.

VI

WE ALSO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROCEDURES WE ARE TO WORK OUT MUST ENSURE THAT NONE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC, QUANTITATIVES, OR QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS OF THE ABM TREATY OR ITS PROTOCOL WILL BE EXCEEDED AS A RESULT OF OVERLAPPING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES, AND MUST ENSURE SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO PERMIT AN ORDERLY REPLACEMENT PROGRAM.

THE U.S. APPROACH IS TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN EVENTS IN THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCESS, VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WHEN THE REPLACED SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS WOULD CEASE TO COUNT TOWARD PERMITTED LEVELS, AND TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN EVENTS IN THE DEPLOYMENT OR REPLACEMENT PROCESS, ALSO VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WHEN THE REPLACEMENT COMPONENT OR SYSTEM WOULD BEGIN TO BE COUNTED.

BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS OF ABM SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS, IT IS THE U.S. VIEW THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY THAT THESE CERTAIN EVENTS BE DIFFERENT FOR DIFFERENT ABM SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS.

MR. COMMISSIONER, THE U.S. COMPONENT BELIEVES THAT THE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE WOULD LEAD TO PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD
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INSURE THAT THE LIMITS OF THE ABM TREATY AND ITS PROTOCOL WOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED DURING THE REPLACEMENT PROCESS; AT THE SAME TIME THEY WOULD PERMIT AN ORDERLY REPLACEMENT PROGRAM WHICH WOULD NOT DIMINISH EITHER SIDE'S SECURITY. THE U.S. APPROACH APPEARS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEW YOU EXPRESSED ON SEPTEMBER 30 WHEN YOU SAID THAT WE MUST TRY TO JOINTLY DETERMINE THE INITIAL CONDITION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, UNDERSTOOD TO BE INITIATION OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT, WHICH WOULD INSURE ITS DETECTION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND WOULD BE RELIABLE EVIDENCE OF INITIATION OF DEPLOYMENT OF ABM SYSTEM REPLACEMENT COMPONENTS.

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ACTION SS-25

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VII

MR. COMMISSIONER, THERE IS COMPLETE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US THAT THE PROCEDURES WE WORKED OUT WOULD BE DIFFERENT FOR ABOVE-GROUND AND SILO ABM LAUNCHERS AND FOR ABM RADARS, AS WELL AS FOR THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ABM RADARS.

WE ALSO AGREE THAT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE REPLACEMENT PROCESS WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE AT A NEW SITE WITHIN A PERMITTED DEPLOYMENT AREA COULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE PROCEDURES FOR REPLACEMENT AT AN EXISTING ABM SITE.

IN ADDITION, THE U.S. COMPONENT BELIEVES THAT, BECAUSE CERTAIN OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS COULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IF ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS WERE TO BE EXCHANGED, THE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE THE SAME AS THOSE APPROPRIATE FOR REPLACEMENT AND DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION WITHIN AN EXISTING DEPLOYMENT AREA.

I ALSO WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT, WHILE THE U.S. COMPONENT
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AGREES THAT COSTS MAY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE AT THE EXPENSE OF ANY VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

VIII

MR. COMMISSIONER, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE ARE AGREED THAT THE PROCEDURES WE ARE TO WORK OUT WILL BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS OF JULY 3, 1974. ON OCTOBER 7, 1974, YOU PUT FORTH A SAMPLE FORMAT FOR THE FORMULATION OF THE PROCEDURES, WE AGREE THAT YOUR SAMPLE FORMAT COULD SERVE AS A USEFUL PATTERN TO ASSIST US IN DEVELOPING PROCEDURES IN A METHODOICAL MANNER. IT MUST, HOWEVER, NOT BE CONSIDERED A RIGID FRAMEWORK.

IX

MR. COMMISSIONER, ON OCTOBER 3, 1974 THE U.S. COMPONENT, HAVING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE BOTH SIDES ATTACH TO THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCC WITH RESPECT TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION, PROPOSED THAT WE BEGIN CONSIDERATION OF A SYSTEM OF PRE-AGREED MESSAGES TO FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THAT AGREEMENT. WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE AGREEMENT BY THE SOVIET COMPONENT THAT DISCUSSIONS ON THIS PROPOSAL CAN BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE NEXT REGULAR SESSION OF THE SCC.

X

FINALLY, MR. COMMISSIONER, WE ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE NEXT REGULAR SESSION OF THE SCC WILL CONVENE IN GENEVA ON MARCH 11, 1975. BOTH SIDES HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO BEGIN AT THAT TIME WORKING OUT SPECIFIC WORDING OF REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, AND TO INITIATE DISCUSSION OF MEASURES RELATED TO SHORTENING THE TIME FOR PROCESSING OF MESSAGES INVOLVING IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION CALLED FOR BY PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES. NATURALLY, EITHER SIDE MAY RAISE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE SCC.

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IN CONCLUSION, I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO YOU PERSONALLY, TO DEPUTY COMMISSIONER KARPOV AND GENERAL BEORGI AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET AND U.S. COMPONENTS FOR THEIR BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF SCC-IV. GRAYBEAL
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